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This is a short paper I did as an undergraduate. I hope you enjoy.
From The Crimea to the Pamirs: The Evolution of British and Russian Relations during the Second Half of the 19th Century
During the century that separated the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the beginning of the First World War, the international relationship between the Russian and British Empires evolved from one of bellicose confidence to one of mutual apprehension and finally to one of increasing cooperation and alliance. This middle period, from the end of the Crimean War in 1856 to the Pamir Settlement in 1895, saw the conquest of Central Asia up to British India by Russia and a subsequent change in British policy when confronting Russian attempts to establish hegemony in the Balkans. By examining the dynamic interactions in the Indian frontier during this period, I have come to the conclusion that while the Crimean War displayed Britain’s power and Russia’s inadequacy in many regards, it ultimately forced Russia to seek venues where it could maximize its power as a heartland power and as a result relegated Britain to a precarious position in its most valued imperial possession, India, where its value as a coastland power provided contradictory answers as to how it should maintain its hegemonic position. This resulted in a change in British policy, from aggressive to apprehensive, towards the Russian Empire during the latter half of the 19th century.
Introduction
During the 19th century, the Russian and British Empires competed for hegemony on the periphery of the Eurasian landmass. British interests clearly resided in the maintenance of her position on the Indian subcontinent and the vital lines of communication that passed through the Mediterranean Sea. Russia’s most important interests resided in the Balkans and its Imperial Mecca, the Czargrad, Constantinople on the Bosporus. British and Russian interests clearly overlapped as a stronger Russian position in the Balkans or on the Straits would upset the balance of power in Europe, allow Russian influence in the Aegean and beyond or threaten the collapse or the Turkish Empire, potentially leading to Russian hegemony in Asia Minor, Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf. These dangers, and competing confidence in military capabilities led to the Crimean War in 1854. While displaying the incompetence of the Russian military and destroying Russian naval power in the Black Sea, the war did little to change the Russian position in the Balkans and by 1878 the Treaty of Paris had been swept aside as Russian armies approached Constantinople. Britain, despite her interests in the region, was unable or unwilling to reawaken the bellicose attitude displayed twenty five years prior. Why did Russia and Britain refrain from using force to assert influence and protect interests in regions of overlapping influence during the second half of the 19th century?
To more completely understand this question one must examine the increasingly complex relationship that the British and Russian empires shared during the latter half of century separating the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the First World War. In order to make this time period more manageable, I have broken this century into the following three distinct periods: 1815-1856, 1856-1895, and 1895-1914.
The first period, immediately following the allied occupation of Paris and the first abdication of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1814, was defined by British and Russian confidence and hostility. This posturing culminated in the Crimean War (1854-1856) and the resulted in the destruction of the Russian navy and its fortress port of Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula. During these forty years, Russian and British interests overlapped heavily, especially in the Aegean and Black Seas where the British felt that further Russian growth could threaten British access to the Near East and compromise the lines of communication to the Indian sub-continent. Both powers were confident of their capabilities and were not subtle in their willingness to use force to achieve any means pertaining to such.
The second period, from the end of the Crimean War and the Treaty of Paris in 1856, to the Pamir Settlement in 1895 was defined by a mutual apprehension. While both powers were more cautious in their behavior towards one another, the British became increasingly less confident in their dealings with Russia. During this period important events were occurring in Central Europe such as the Franco-Prussian War and the creation of the German Empire, Kaiser Wilhelm II’s rise to power in 1888 and Admiral Tirpitz’s restyling of the German Empire’s Navy to a blue water fleet capable of projecting power into the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean from 1897-1900.
In the Eastern Mediterranean, British interests shifted to the Suez Canal, which they gained control of in 1875 only six years after its construction. In Central Asia, Russia turned its attention to conquest and integration, building railways and a military industrial complex in Turkestan up to the gates of British India.
The third period, from the Pamir Settlement to the beginning of the First World War, was defined by increased cooperation and alliance between Russia and Britain, facilitated greatly by a triangular alliance structure envisioned by France. The cooperation between Russia and Britain was motivated largely by a desire to balance power against the rising German power. This threat to Britain was so great that by the time of the Great War the Russians were promised the prizes it had sought for so long and Britain had once fought; Constantinople and the Straits, hegemony in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Persia, and most importantly, access to the Mediterranean.
Since I am most interested in examining the change in British policy towards the Russian Empire during the second period, namely a shift from confident assertion to apprehension, I must study the two regions where British and Russian interests most prominently overlapped. The two regions include, at their most specific points, the Bosporus and Straits, including the Black, Aegean, and Eastern Mediterranean Seas and the Balkans, and the Hindu Kush and Himalayas separating India and Central Asia. Because researching the events, both real and perceived, in both of these regions would potentially overstep the scope of this project, I have decided to focus solely on the latter, Central Asia. By focusing on only one aspect of the interdependent relationship between the two regions, I am forced to admit that my research is incomplete without committing more investigation into the second region. It does, however, afford me the opportunity to develop a more concise research question: How did Russia’s threat to British Northwest India shape the international relationship between the two powers during the 19th from century?
Literature Review
In researching this topic, I have focused upon two bodies of work, one theoretical and one narrative. The first, theoretical, has offered me either a basis on which to develop a new theory or displayed the limitations of previous studies affording me an opportunity to make a worthwhile contribution to the topic. By examining the differing opinions provided for Russian or British relative action during the 19th century, I have been able to formulate a solid supplemental base on which to place my thesis. These theoretical bodies of work in which I have chosen to focus upon are by John P. LeDonne, R.W. Pethybridge, and Warren B. Walsh. The second body of work, the narrative accounts of Karl E. Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac, and G.J. Alder, has served two purposes. The first, and potentially most important, is that it lends a relatively comprehensive guide to the complicated and dynamic situation of the period. Secondly, in the absence of the ability to obtain significant quantities of primary research materials, these narrative accounts have provided primary source material or included relatively unbiased presentation of the facts.
In The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917 and The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650-1831, John P. LeDonne presents a sound theoretical model for understanding the relationship between heartland and coastland powers, or more specifically, the relationship between Russia and many of its neighbors including Great Britain. The heartland is loosely defined as the bulk of the interior on the Eurasian landmass, bordered by the Norwegian Alps through Germany, the Balkans and Black Sea Basin across the Caucasus, Himalayas and Eastern Turkestan southeast of the Altai. The Coastland lies along the periphery of this landmass including Western Europe and the Monsoon Coastland of South and East Asia.[1] LeDonne’s assessment of the strengths and limitations of these two powers reside in his definitions of the military-political strategies, forward policy-fleet in being and close border-fortress fleet loosely defined as, in the former, a dynamic policy to cooperate with peripheral states and pursue a policy to control vital sea lanes or, in the latter, a policy to retrench, exclude, and defend.[2] While Russia was able at different periods to pursue both of these strategies, at an aggregate examination, the period examined was largely defined by Russia’s growing lack of dynamism, most apparently at sea, and Britain’s continued dynamism. The most important feature of this relationship between heartland and coastland power resides in the fact that both usually find difficulty decisively engaging either because of the difference in military and political philosophies.
I believe much of LeDonne’s model to be accurate but potentially not applied correctly. For instance, despite Britain’s overwhelming victory over the Russian Navy, and its supporting military, the British could remove Russia’s ability to threaten communication lines to India but could do little to actually defeat RussiaNorthwest India is something that LeDonne neglected. conclusively. Russia’s adoption of a forward policy in Central Asia as a result of its defeat in the southwest theatre further displayed the limitations of Britain’s power as a coastland power and easily threatened Britain’s international position far more than the military defeat at Sevastopol damaged Russian prestige. This examination of the change to a forward policy in Northwest India is something that LeDonne neglected.
Furthermore, LeDonne asserts that Russia’s expansion was internally defined and continual in all theatres, only slowing as barriers presented themselves. Despite his insistence that there was not a pendulum swing between theatres, I believe that Russian action in Central Asia was a direct response to defeat in the Crimean War, specifically in hope of placing pressure on British interests, where they were potentially very weak. This action would open the opportunity to for a free hand in the Balkans while simultaneously restoring international and internal prestige. Using Ledonne’s model I hope to display that British external pressure was the main factor for Russian conquest in Central Asia and that Russia was not awaiting British weakness in the Balkans but instead actively cultivating it in the hopes of opening more realistic opportunities in the Balkans.
R.W. Pettybridge’s article, British Imperialists in the Russian Empire, examines the paradoxical relationship between Britain and Russia during the period between the Crimean and First World War’s. Pettybridge asserts that the trade relationship was so strong that open hostility, while frequently a threat, was ultimately avoided due to the strong economic binds between the two states.[3] I find this explanation inadequate for several reasons. First, while economic interdependence is usually a present condition in cooperative relationships it is almost always never a necessary condition. If one examines the trade levels immediately preceding the First World War, levels that have only recently been comparable reached again, this idea quickly becomes less tenable than previously believed. In addition, to assume that economic necessity was the driving force, one must assume that the state that made the most surprising concessions, Britain, would have been most dependent on Russian resources. This simply appears not to be the case, especially later in the nineteenth century as Britain’s dependence on non-colonial naval supplies dropped significantly. If economic reasons were a factor, it would lay in the context that I am asserting when I presume that BritainRussia’s threat to unsettle Britain’s economic empire in India. changed its aggressive posture as a response to
Warren B. Walsh’s article, The Russian Imperial Staff and India: A Footnote to Diplomatic History, examines the feasibility of a Russian attack on India. While Walsh admits the utility of perception in shaping British policy towards the Russian threat to India, he ultimately seems inclined to believe that the reality of such an attack was not present.[4] I also deem that perception played a large part in influencing this relationship but also feel that the threat of attack was based on realistic conditions. Walsh’s ideas may be hindered on the basis that he may believe that the threat, if based on real military invasion, must be of one that includes a large Russian force capable of defeating a large British-Indian force and consolidating victory after this engagement. I believe that such a military engagement would have been impossible but that Russia could have placed a military force in the theatre capable of creating enough of a security threat to potentially diminish Britain’s position in India resulting not in a conquest of India by Russia but an expulsion of Britain from India that would have had far reaching consequences throughout the rest of the empire.
G.J. Alder’s British India’s Northern Frontier, 1865-1895, and Karl E. Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac’s Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia, provide excellent narrative accounts of the dynamic situation in Central Asia and Northern India during the late nineteenth century. Both provide access to numerous primary documents and present information containing both British and Russian perspectives at both the individual and state levels of analysis. As stated previously, these sources provide a better overall understanding of the events but leave me little room to argue for or against.
While I believe that all of these works offer useful information to interpret many aspects of British and Russian relations during the latter half of the 19th century, I hope to offer a more specialized account of the evolution between the relations between the two powers. LeDonne does an excellent job of providing a generalized model that can be further tailored to better understand the specifics between Britain’s response to Russia’s growing power in the East MediterraneanCentral Asia. I do however, believe that Walsh and Pethybridge are incorrect or incomplete in their assumptions and hope to display this in my research. Ultimately I believe that my model, when complete, will further display LeDonne’s assumptions on the respective utility between Coastland and Heartland powers, something that has very contemporary applications in examining the relations between China, Russia, and the United States.
Feasibility and Perception of a Threat in India
When researching the evolving relationship of the British and Russian Empires during the 19th century, one can quickly identify a change in British posturing as Russian conquests in Central Asia placed both Empires within a morning’s ride of each other. I believe that while the Crimean War displayed Britain’s power and Russia’s inadequacy in many regards, it ultimately forced Russia to seek venues where it could maximize its power as a heartland power and as a result relegated Britain to a precarious position in its most valued imperial possession, India, where its value as a coastland power provided contradictory answers as to how it should maintain its hegemonic position. This resulted in a change in British policy, from aggressive to apprehensive, towards the Russian Empire during the latter half of the 19th century. By examining the feasibility of such an attack, and the perception on both sides, I hope to arrive at a more concrete conclusion in regards to the above.
Feasibility
To examine the feasibility of such a threat, I must conclude that Russia would use the same tactics that it had employed against previous states, namely weakening the position of the state in question by destabilizing border regions through the support of conflicting regimes or political movements. This would lead me to believe that a successful conclusion concerning the topic would be achieved if it could be displayed that Russia could attain these same conditions in Northern India. The focus of my research resides in geography; was the region accessible to political agents and a small military force?; tribal alliances; were the British having difficulty maintaining a hegemonic position in these border regions and were the Russians able to establish and maintain positive relations with these tribes in question?; and what military and political advantages would either power possess or be deprive of if facing off in the region?
Geography
The terrain separating the northern plains of India and the southern plains in Turkestan are some of the most rugged and imposing on the face of the Earth. The two major mountain ranges, the Hindu Kush and Karakoram, average 4,000 to 4,500 meters in height and reach maximize levels of 7,700 and 8,611 meters respectively. From India looking north, the Hindu Kush rises just beyond the Indus valley and Kashmir straddles (mostly south) the Karakoram range.[5] Kashmir is based on a plateau of such great height above the northern Indian plateau that it was compared to a mountain fortress by the British.[6] On the other side of these mountains lay more minor ranges spreading into Afghanistan in the northwest and Kashgar in the northeast.[7]
For the purpose of this research, I have split the 1000 mile frontier of Northwest British India into three regions. In the east, lies the region of Kashmir straddling the Karakoram range with passes connecting Kashgar and Ladakh. The British identified these passes as potential military access points between the two regions citing the fact that trade routes had connected the two regions for centuries despite the inherently difficult nature of the climate and terrain.[8] These ideas were abandoned over time due to the difficulty Britain had in tying Kashmir’s economy with India and Kashgar and finally, despite reports in 1874 that the Karakoram passes were the easiest route to Eastern Turkestan, by 1877-1878 these ideas were completely dropped.[9]
In the center or north, in the region where the Hindu Kush and Karakoram ranges meet and reside at their lowest levels lay the Pamir. This range separates modern day Pakistan, with the Hunka and Yasin valleys, and Tajikistan separated by the thin Pamir valley in Afghanistan. This valley, while at consistent levels of 3,000 meters and host to lengthy winters, provided the most realistic access points between these two regions using the Ishkoman and Kilik passes.[10]
In west, the region of the Western Pamir and the rising to the heights of the Hindu Kush, separates the modern day Pakistani region of Chitral and Northeastern Afghanistan. This range contains two important passes, the Nuksan and Dora, which lead down to the Chitral and Indus valleys.[11]
This region, while difficult to traverse with traditional military forces, is definitely passable by smaller irregular forces, as has been displayed by economic ties. The most likely route for a feasible invasion of Northern India would likely have been through the Pamir range. This conclusion is due largely to the fact that the range was relatively low, included several realistic passes, was close to Russian supply bases in Samarkand and Kokand and, as I will elaborate earlier, presented less political entanglements than Afghanistan proper or Kashgar would have presented. In my opinion, access between the two regions, India and Turkestan, was possible if maximizing the utility of irregular military forces.
Tribal Relations
The political situation in this region is as fragmented and difficult as the terrain. This state of affairs was only exacerbated by the fact that Britain had to juggle relations between Hindu and Muslim subjects, both foreign to their own predominately Christian beliefs. Britain’s position in the Muslim lands of the north was never secure even when compared to the precarious position that Britain held in India due to the limited numerical ration, about 60,000 British to 200 million Indians in the latter half of the 19th century.[12] The British viewed the region in three separate parts: beyond the Hindu Kush and Karakoram ranges containing Kashgar, Afghanistan, and Kokand; straddling these ranges, Kashmir and other smaller mountain tribes; and south of these ranges, the Sikh lands.
Afghanistan presented Britain with many problems during the 19th century and British policy was altered many times to reflect this. Despite initial victories in both the First (1839) and Second (1879) Afghan Wars, the British could not secure power in this region across the Hindu Kush. During the First Afghan War the British hoped to establish both a military and political presence only to be forced out after disappointing outcomes in Kabul and Kandahar. Between the wars the British hoped that they could use Afghanistan as a buffer to continued Russian expansion in the region. Unfortunately for the British, they were forced to become reinvolved in Afghan affairs to support Sher Ali in the hopes of defending the regime against potential Russian annexation. The British also believed that by providing support to Sher Ali, he would refrain from appealing Russians for similar support, increasing their influence there.[13] Ultimately the British were pulled back into Kabul in 1877 due to Sher Ali’s calling of holy war in the Indian provinces in Swat, Bajaur, and Dir, much to the surprise and dismay of the British who could not tolerate insurrections in the empire, especially after lending support to the Sher Ali regime.[14] The Second Afghan War, with many of the same outcomes as the First Afghan War, finally forced Britain to accept their position on the Indian side of the Hindu Kush and further solidified the British policy of using Afghanistan solely as a buffer state.[15]
Kashmir and the tribal lands in the mountains surrounding the Yasin and Hunza valleys presented almost as many problems for the British as Afghanistan did. Despite Britain supporting Hindu political leadership, up to 80% of the population was comprised of Muslim subjects. In the years immediately following the selling of Kashmir to Gulab Singh in the late 1840’s, British attempts to incorporate Kashmir to India and Central Asia through economic integration were continually foiled due to poor native administration.[16] These failed attempts at economic integration with regions north of the Karakoram range carried over to political integration as instability and resistance to the Singh regime negatively influenced the ability for the British to establish durable relations with Yakub Beg in Turkestan during the 1870’s.[17] By 1878 the British concluded that an invasion through the Karakoram Range was less likely than other routes and began to treat Kashmir as a British controlled buffer state. The British were never completely sure how loyalties may lie, or if Muslim tribes, especially in the region of the Pamirs, would seek or support Russian forces in the hope of gaining power. It seems likely that the British had little ability to support the Hindu regime if these events did occur.
The Sikh lands, combined with Kashmir prior to 1846, included the province of Panjab. Sikh and British loyalty evolved, both positively, such as Rajat Singh’s support during the First Afghan War and negatively, such as the same Rajat Singh’s reception of Russian agents early in the 19th century, culminating in the war of 1845 and eventual annexation in 1849.[18] The British could not tolerate unquestionable loyalty so close to, and residing in, the northern Indian plain. With the exception of the deposed Duleep Singh’s request for Russian assistance in regaining the Sikh throne, the incorporation of Panjab into British India alleviated many of the security problems that territory to the north continued to present.[19] Punjab’s position placed it well within Britain’s realistic grab and made its incorporation into the empire logical and successful.
As the 19th century progressed, British policymakers took a more realistic approach to the control and administration of the borderlands straddling this region. After the high cost and failure of the Afghan wars, the British essentially admitted that they could essentially only maximize control south of the Hindu Kush and Karakoram ranges, imposing significant control and providing realistic defense.[20] North of these ranges, all the British could hope to do was to display a strategic interest but not consistent control. These political entities, both north and south of this range, were self-serving and were as susceptible to Russian as British interests. In fact, the tribes would likely be more willing to side with the state that would restore previous positions of power by challenging the status quo. As the 1857 Indian revolution displayed, the British position was weakening and subject to destabilization that could have long lasting and far reaching imperial consequences.[21]
Heartland vs. Coastland
When the coastland power, Britain, and the heartland power, Russia, squared off in the Crimean War the advantages and limitations of Britain quickly became apparent. Despite a humbling defeat and loss of naval power in the Black Sea, Russia was not brought to its knees by a British land force. A substantial percentage of the military force that overcame the Russian garrison at Sevastopol were French and Turkish, not British. In addition, the threat of an Austrian land invasion was ultimately the decisive factor in bringing Russia to the negotiating table. British naval force, while dynamic and powerful, could do little to threaten the Russian Empire once it abandoned to seek power or tactics that could be challenged by Britain. With the conquest of Central Asia, the Russians could maximize their tactics, both political and military, far from the powerful British Navy, in a theater that was much more sensitive to British Imperial livelihood than the Balkans and the Bosporus.
As a coastland power, Britain was unparalleled in naval supremacy, maintaining communications with their colonies and providing security by controlling maritime chokepoints. The problem that Britain encountered in India lay in the distances in which they could maximize their power. In governing India, Britain proved capable, especially when considering the disproportionate ration between the British and the Indian subjects. These problems grew exponentially when moving away from the coast and were lucidly displayed with crossing the Hindu Kush and Karakoram Ranges.[22] In the Hindu Kush, Britain proved that they had difficult problems in protecting north of it and would likely have had problems reasserting power if threatened south of it.[23] The British Army was placed in a difficult position in stabilizing and defending such a large frontier across terrain that did not facilitate trouble-free communications.[24]
Russian retrenchment to the its acceptance as a heartland power led to a new dynamism that resulted in the annexation of Central Asia up to the gates of India. The administration in Central Asia proved to be more capable of conquest in the region and could have been potentially more capable in threatening the British position if needed. The first advantage of Russia laid in the autonomous and military nature of the political structure implemented in Turkestan, while not allowing for dynamic economic policy, facilitated quick decision making and that could capitalize any specialized opportunities. These policies directly led to a superior position in dealing with Yakub Beg and Kashgar in the 1870’s. The second advantage of Russia laid in its policy of fostering chaos on frontier areas as a means to destabilize and eventually conquer these border regions.
India, it must be assumed, lies on the periphery of the Coastland and Heartland regions. This placed Russia in a dominate position where Britain, because of their Coastland limitations, could not maximize force. Russia was capable of fostering chaos on the border regions and could have directly threatened the British position in India.[25] This was reflected after the Treaty of St. Stephano in 1878 in which a British Squadron did little to influence the Russian decision to renegotiate gains at the Congress of Berlin, instead caving to Austrian and German pressure.
Perception
As is true in almost any event, a perception of actions can be a highly influential factor in determining behavior. In many cases, the feasibility of a situation can be grossly over or underestimated. To examine this situation I have identified two important research areas, Russian threats and British perception of the events.
Russian Threats
It is often speculated that Napoleon’s 1788-89 campaign in Egypt was motivated by the hopes of cutting communications between Britain and India or even threatening direct intervention on the subcontinent. By threatening Britain’s most important imperial possession, it was believed that the British naval advantage could be reduced or eliminated. Catherine the Great had made similar conclusions in the 1780’s and the Russian General Staff had begun to incorporate plans for an overland invasion of India via Central Asia as early as the beginning of the 19th century.[26]
In 1812 a Russian agent, Agha Mehdi made a diplomatic trip to Northern India but it was not until the conclusion of the Crimean War that Russia began to solidify a position in Central Asia. By 1868, with the conquest of Bukhara, Russia inherited rights that stretched into Afghanistan and Northern India presenting a problem to the British position. The conquest of Kokand in 1876, continued activity in Kashgar during the 1870’s and the conquest of Geok Tepe in 1881 brought a three pronged threat to British interests in India and Afghanistan.[27] This consolidation of empire and land access, greatly enhanced by the completion of the Trans-Caspian railway in 1880, brought about a general pressure upon British India. It is at this point that Russian threats began to shake British Imperial interests on the subcontinent.
In the 1869 the Russian General Staff believed that by gaining a position in Kashgar it could secure the most feasible invasion route into India via Kashmir.[28] In 1870 an unstable Kashmir made overtures towards Russia citing parallel mutual interests. This lead Russia to believe that a stronger position in Kashgar could lead to such great concern in Britain that they would would be relegated to a position of impotence when responding to Russian action in the Balkans.[29] The height of Russian threat to Kashmir via Kashgar was in 1878 as Britain and Russia prepared for war following the Turkish signing of the Treaty of St. Stefano. Three Russian military columns were dispatched to advance towards India at the same time the British were making preparations for similar operations in the opposite direction. These preparations were for naught as the Russian’s agreed to participate in the Congress of Berlin, removing the threat of war. The route through Kashgar was soon eliminated as the Chinese reasserted power in the region during the same time period.
After the crossing of the Karakoram passes was removed as a possible invasion route into Kasmir, Russia began to search for a more realistic venue in which to place pressure upon the British position in India. In 1880 the Russian General Staff identified the Pamir Range and Valley as a more accessible route as the passes were more realistic, Russia controlled the territory directly north of this small strip of land and potentially hostile (to the British) tribes resided in the Chitral, Hunza and Yasin valleys.[30] Internal preparations were made for this eventuality as the Trans-Caspian line was extended to Samarkand in 1887 and externally as Russia attempted to establish a military post south of the Pamir in Hunza in 1888.[31] These tensions culminated in the three Pamir Crisis from 1892-1895, bringing Russia and Britain to the brink of war, due in part to Russia attempting to establish a hegemonic position in the Pamir. This crisis was settled in 1895 and although the Russian General Staff regarded an Indian invasion as a distinct possibility, tensions never ran as high as they had from the years of 1870-1895 due largely to a change in the geopolitical environment.
British Perception
Britain’s concern over their position in India appeared to be the driving force in British policy making during the 19th century. The importance of maintaining prestige in the empire was a necessity and nowhere was this more thru than on the subcontinent. Varying levels of paranoia over threats, either directly or indirectly, contributed to Britain intervention during the first half of the 19th century in Egypt during the Napoleonic campaign, the Peloponnese during the Greek War of independence, in Afghanistan during the first Afghan War, in Punjab during the Sikh War, and in Bulgaria and the Crimea during the Crimean War. The role of British perception to a threat to either the lines of communication to India or India proper is well documented and greatly contributed to the formulation of British policy as the 19th century progressed.
In mush the same fashion as Russian threats, prior to 1878 Britain believed the most likely Russian military invasion route into India would be via Kashgar, across the Karakoram and into Kashmir. Britain’s hold on Kashmir was always questionable and was strained by the insistence by the British to encourage the Kashmiri regime to exert influence over further Muslim tribes in the mountain valleys. A generally insecure feeling about Kashmir, influenced by a growing relationship with the Russians, led British policymakers to believe that the region was highly sensitive and unstable, leading the British to fear that even a if a small Russian military force moved into the Kashmir plateau, in cooperation with the regime, or by returning the old Muslim sources of power, it could hold the region and create enormous problems for the British position throughout the rest of the subcontinent.[32] In 1868 Lord Forsyth testified to the fears:
“In real sober truth, India is more vulnerable by Russia on the north than on any other side. For, whereas if she approached India through Afghanistan, she would have to traverse poor and probably hostile country, far from her supports, on the north she would step from the rich country of Turkistan at once within the red line which bounds British territory. It is not necessary to suppose that Russia would march all through Kashmir and pour her troops through the Pir Panjaul Passes into the plains of the Panjab.”[33]
Britain began to prepare for such an eventuality by attempting to strengthen the Indian army in the north in 1878 after the treaty of St. Stephano. The most surprising feature of British fear in Kashmir is that it was still heightened even after 1878 when the Chinese removed Yakub Beg, and Russian influence, in Kashgar effectively placing the Chinese Empire as a buffer between Russian hostility. In fact, the British surprisingly made unprecedented diplomatic offers to China by offering an exchange of consulates, a British consulate in Kashgar for a Chinese consulate in Hong Kong. This bargaining displayed the apprehensive nature of British policymaking in the region and was her prestige was ultimately further weakened when China refused.[34]
The shift in Russia activity from Kashgar to the Pamir region proved to be more dangerous to the British than the previous arrangement. This new theater could provide far less problematic access to Northern India and allow for insurrections on either flank of a British defending force. The British position in Kashmir was a continous defense concern but it was quite consistent with the situation in Afghanistan. After the second Afghan War the British resigned to a position southeast of the Hindu Kush and remained impotent in the affairs north of the range. During the Pamir Crisis, the British believed that the chaotic situation in Afghanistan was leading to a privledged position for the Russians in Kabul and that any hostility in the region would quickly spread south of the Hindu Kush.[35] In 1889 the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg testified to the fact that this tactic was highly regarded by Russian planners and had been used to expedite Russian expansion in the past.[36] During the Pamir Crisis’ from 1892-1895, these fears reached a fever pitch but dropped significantly after the Pamir settlement although it remained a constant concern up to 1914.
As early as the Napoleonic Wars, Britain realized that the threat to India could present major problems to its international position, particularly in its colonial holdings. Despite Napoleon’s attempt to cut communications between Britain and India in the Egyptian campaign, the naval supremacy of Britain could still overcome any threatening behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly against another Coastland power. It was not until the expansion in Central Asia after the Crimean War resulted in Russia and Britain nearly sharing imperial borders, that both the British public and policymakers realized the limitations of British power in the region. These realizations led to a constant paranoia during the latter half of the 19th century nearly resulting in wars on several occasions while simultaneously preventing British threats of war in regions where Britain had otherwise resorted to the use of force to protect interests previously.[37]
Conclusion
During my research I have discovered correlative evidence linking the nature of British policy during the latter half of the 19th century to the threat that Russian was able to exert on India. The preliminary evidence gathered appears to indicate that the British were less willing to go to war in 1878 over the maintenance of Turkish interests than they were in 1854. This despite the fact that Britain had a clear legal precedent in the Treaty of Paris and the same obligation to limit Russia access and influence to the Eastern Mediterranean. This behavior seems closely tied to the precarious British position in India due the military and political capabilities presented by the Russians in the theater. The British believed Russian threats in the Northern India to be sincere and based on feasible military plans. A threat to the British position in the Indian subcontinent would have had implications around the world and could destroy British hegemony in many of her colonies. Britain realized that her navy could do little to limit the Russian army, especially in a region where she could exert little force or maintain solid political footing. If Britain was to maintain her position in India she would have to do so by maintaining a non-hostile relationship with Russia, even if it meant allowing Russian power to increase in the Balkans.
Works Cited
Alder, G.J. British India’s Northern Frontier 1865-95: A Study in Imperial Policy. Plymouth: Longmans, 1963
Brysac, Shareen Blair and Meyer, Karl E. Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia. Washington D.C.: Counterpoint, 1999
LeDonne, John P. The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997
Pethybridge, R.W. “British Imperialist in the Russian Empire.” Russian Review. 30 No. 4 (1971)
Walsh, Warren B. “The Imperial Russian General Staff and India: A Footnote to Diplomatic History.” Russian Review. 16 No. 2 (1957)
Bibliography
Alder, G.J. British India’s Northern Frontier 1865-95: A Study in Imperial Policy. Plymouth: Longmans, 1963
Allworth, Edward. Central Asia: 130 Years of Russian Dominance, A Historical Overview. 3rd ed. Durham: Duke University Press, 1994
Art, Robert J. and Jervis, Robert. International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues. 6th ed. New York: Longman, 2003
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[1] LeDonne, John P. The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997 pg.2-7
[2] LeDonne 1997 pg. 6-8
[3] Pethybridge, R.W. “British Imperialist in the Russian Empire.” Russian Review. 30 No. 4 (1971) pg. 354-355
[4] Walsh, Warren B. “The Imperial Russian General Staff and India: A Footnote to Diplomatic History.” Russian Review. 16 No. 2 (1957) pg. 56-59
[5] Alder, G.J. British India’s Northern Frontier 1865-95: A Study in Imperial Policy. Plymouth: Longmans, 1963 pg.13
[6] Alder 1963 pg. 6, 7
[7] ibid xiv
[8] ibid 17
[9] Alder, G.J. British India’s Northern Frontier 1865-95: A Study in Imperial Policy. Plymouth: Longmans, 1963 pg. 20-25, 53,57, 57,67
[10] Alder 1963 pg. 57, 106
[11] ibid 103
[12] Alder, G.J. British India’s Northern Frontier 1865-95: A Study in Imperial Policy. Plymouth: Longmans, 1963 pg. 3
[13] Alder, G.J. British India’s Northern Frontier 1865-95: A Study in Imperial Policy. Plymouth: Longmans, 1963 pg. 165 and Brysac, Shareen Blair and Meyer, Karl E. Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia. Washington D.C.: Counterpoint, 1999 pg. 180-182
[14] Alder 1963 pg. 120
[15] ibid 38
[16] ibid 20-25
[17] ibid 43,44
[18] Alder, G.J. British India’s Northern Frontier 1865-95: A Study in Imperial Policy. Plymouth: Longmans, 1963 pg. 165 pg.16,20
[19] Brysac, Shareen Blair and Meyer, Karl E. Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia. Washington D.C.: Counterpoint, 1999 pg. 255-258
[20] Alder 1963 pg. 13
[21] LeDonne, John P. The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997 pg. 338
[22] LeDonne, John P. The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997 pg. 332
[23] LeDonne 1997 pg. 327
[24] Alder, G.J. British India’s Northern Frontier 1865-95: A Study in Imperial Policy. Plymouth: Longmans, 1963 pg. 115 and LeDonne 1997 pg. 300
[25] Alder, G.J. British India’s Northern Frontier 1865-95: A Study in Imperial Policy. Plymouth: Longmans, 1963 pg. 300, 305 and LeDonne, John P. The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997 pg. 338
[26] Alder 1963 pg. 2
[27] Alder 1963 pg. 44,45 and Brysac, Shareen Blair and Meyer, Karl E. Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the Race for Empire in Central Asia. Washington D.C.: Counterpoint, 1999
pg. 132
[28] Alder 1963 pg. 96,97
[29] ibid pg. 70,108
[30] Alder, G.J. British India’s Northern Frontier 1865-95: A Study in Imperial Policy. Plymouth: Longmans, 1963 pg. 57
[31] Alder 1963 pg. 157,160
[32] Alder, G.J. British India’s Northern Frontier 1865-95: A Study in Imperial Policy. Plymouth: Longmans, 1963 pg. 98, 108
[33] Alder 1963 pg. 98
[34] Alder, G.J. British India’s Northern Frontier 1865-95: A Study in Imperial Policy. Plymouth: Longmans, 1963 pg. 74, 86
[35] Alder 1963 pg. 153
[36] LeDonne, John P. The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997 pg. 135
[37] Alder, G.J. British India’s Northern Frontier 1865-95: A Study in Imperial Policy. Plymouth: Longmans, 1963 pg. 71
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